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Conventional accounts of the twoconflicts tend to lump Japanese and
Asian experiences into one basket with
the shared labels ‘imperialism versus
nationalism’ and ‘oppression versus
resistance.’ To a certain extent this
remains accurate, but there were impor-
tant differences between how Japan’s
occupation of China and its occupations
in Southeast Asia were apprehended
and experienced by occupier and occu-
pied. At the same time, the two conflicts
were related in complex ways.
Coming home
The case of Japanese-Indonesian rela-
tions in occupied Java and their rela-
tionship to the Sino-Japanese War serves
as a brief example. When Japanese
forces landed on Java in March 1942,
they brought with them a stirring, revo-
lutionary message: Japan’s occupation
of Indonesia represented neither impe-
rialist aggression nor a local version of
Western colonialism, but the realization
of a world-historical mission to ‘liberate’
Japan’s Asian brethren from Western
capitalism and colonialism, and to build
a harmoniously ‘Asian’ order tran-
scending modernity’s social ills. In
ancient times, Asia had been a unified
and powerful cultural whole; the success
of Japan’s new Asia-building project
depended on a cultural return to the
shared Asian values and unity that
Western imperialism, capitalism, and
individualism had undermined. Japan,
alone among Asian societies in having
maintained its political autonomy and
Eastern cultural essence while master-
ing Western science and technology, was
uniquely, ‘naturally’ qualified to lead this
Asian renaissance.
Java’s indigenous population had long
been suffering under Dutch colonial
domination, and many, particularly
among its educated elite, were in search
of a new post-colonial order. Many
Indonesians thus welcomed the Japan-
ese and were captivated by their prom-
ises, particularly given that beyond occa-
sional contact with local Japanese
shopkeepers – who had an overwhelm-
ingly positive reputation – Indonesians
had little direct experience of Japan and
its empire. The demonstration of Japan-
ese power represented by the rollback of
the Americans, British, and Dutch in
the Pacific between December 1941 and
March 1942, unprecedented in speed
and scope, was further incentive to fol-
low Japan’s lead. And while many
Indonesians were aware that Japan had
been waging war in China for several
years, longstanding class and racial ten-
sions between the indigenous popula-
tion and local ethnic Chinese - who
dominated the lower reaches of the
economy and were widely perceived as
capitalist-colonial henchmen of the
Dutch rulers -  offset the potential for
anti-Japanese solidarity. 
For their part, many Japanese who took
part in the invasion were overwhelmed
by the Indonesian welcome, and were
quick to see in Indonesia proof of the
world-historical righteousness of Japan’s
mission as Asia’s leader and liberator.
Many went so far as to interpret their
comfort in Java - reinforced by what they
saw as uncanny racial, linguistic and cul-
tural similarities between Indonesians
and Japanese - as confirmation of a
‘fresh start’ for Asia as well as a ‘home-
coming’ to the long-lost Asian brethren
described in Japan’s own propaganda.
Northeast Asian roots
While Japan’s message was new and
appealing to many Indonesians, for Chi-
nese, Koreans, and others who bore the
brunt of Japanese expansionism in
Northeast Asia, the language of ‘libera-
tion’ and ‘return to Asia’ had a familiar
and by now hollow ring. This was no
coincidence, for while it was now direct-
ed at Southeast Asians, the message of
‘Greater Asia’ was originally meant for
Northeast Asian consumption. And wit-
tingly or not, Chinese resistance had
played a critical role in its making, elab-
oration, and radicalization. 
Up to the 1930s, Japanese justifications
for imperial expansion and colonial rule
had largely mirrored those of the West-
ern powers: the protection of Japan’s
military-strategic ‘spheres of interest’,
the securing of vital raw materials, land,
and markets, and in more idealistic
terms, the bringing of ‘civilization and
enlightenment’ to ‘backward peoples’,
the ‘suppression of disorder’, ‘banditry’
and the like. From around the late
1920s, however - alongside increasing
calls for domestic social renovation - a
more aggressive expansionism came to
the fore. The push for internal reform
and external expansion emerged against
the backdrop of socio-economic dislo-
cation in the wake of the Great Depres-
sion, which brought suffering domesti-
cally and heightened protectionism and
competition between the imperial pow-
ers internationally. The shift was further
fueled by fear of the Soviet Union and
its commitment to exporting commu-
nist revolution, along with  increasing-
ly assertive Chinese nationalism. From
1931, the empire-building project in
Manchuria became the focus of Japan-
ese ambitions, and was billed as a model
solution to Japan’s domestic problems.
Imperial crisis
At the same time, the interwar period
was a time of crisis in the legitimacy of
imperialism itself. Chinese nationalist
resistance to Japanese encroachment
was a regional play on the global theme
of anti-colonialism, which was gaining
the moral high ground as the ‘trend of
the times’, articulated by such spokes-
men as Mahatma Gandhi and encour-
aged by the Marxist-Leninist critique of
imperialism and Woodrow Wilson’s
acknowledgement of the ‘right to
national self-determination’. Just as the
Great Depression and crisis of interna-
tional capitalism made the securing of
empire seem more important than ever
to Japan – and to Britain, Holland, and
France – empire as such was becoming
harder to justify, internationally as well
as domestically.
The Japanese ideology of ‘Greater Asia’
that took shape in the 1930s arose in,
and reflected, this specific ‘late imperi-
al’ context. The nominal political ‘inde-
pendence’ of Manchukuo, along with its
rhetoric of ‘racial harmony and broth-
erhood’ - in what was little more than a
Japanese puppet-state - were expressions
of its contradictions. Above all, tenacious
Chinese resistance in the subsequent
full-scale war in the Chinese heartland
produced the social and ideological con-
ditions whereby what had started as a
relatively straightforward imperialist
mission had to become, in the eyes of
many Japanese, something much more
noble and profound. This Chinese
resistance came as a shock to most
Japanese, who expected to deliver a
quick, decisive blow to the ‘renegade’
forces of Chiang Kai-shek when the con-
flict began in mid-1937. But as months
turned into years, the Japanese found
themselves in a military and moral
quagmire; continued mobilization of a
tired populace and ‘pacification’ of the
‘inscrutably’ resistant Chinese demand-
ed a cause that transcended the old jus-
tifications for empire - ideally, a cause
that could transcend empire itself. 
Yet, despite increasingly sophisticated
elaboration, Japanese attempts to justi-
fy the war as a holy mission to establish
a ‘Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity
Sphere’ and ‘liberate Asia’ from West-
ern colonial domination – ideas that res-
onated profoundly in Japanese society –
largely failed to strike a chord among
Chinese. The shocking brutality of the
conflict, continued Japanese racism and
arrogance, the complex structure of Chi-
nese domestic social and political rela-
tions, and, if this were not enough, the
accumulated weight of history in the
form of a common perception of Japan
and the Japanese as scheming, self-
aggrandizing ‘imperialists’ – in tandem
with longstanding assumptions of Chi-
nese cultural superiority over their geo-
graphically smaller, ‘peripheral’ neigh-
bour – inhibited local receptivity to
Japanese claims of acting as ‘Asia’s lib-
erator’, let alone any legitimacy as ‘Asia’s
leader’.
It is only against this highly charged
and contested Northeast Asian forma-
tive background that Japanese ideolo-
gy and propaganda in Southeast Asia –
with its revolutionary evocation of an
empire that could transcend imperial-
ism, an Asian brotherhood that could
transcend capitalism, an Asian moder-
nity that could transcend Western
modernity – can be understood. For
reasons discussed briefly above, Java’s
population proved more open than
their Chinese counterparts to ideas of
a Japanese-sponsored ‘Asian’ alterna-
tive to Western rule and modernity. For
their part, Japanese responses to this
situation – in many ways almost a
sense of religious redemption for
themselves, their nation, and its impe-
rial project – must be understood in the
context of frustrations built up in the
course of the China conflict. They
reflect the degree to which Chinese
resistance had threatened to under-
mine the legitimacy of Japan’s empire
– and how much Japanese had invest-
ed in the imperial project.
Recalling the earlier struggles and frus-
trations of a Japanese propaganda unit
in China in a mid-1942 column, news-
paper editor Shimizu Nobuo articulated
the sense of relief and newfound confi-
dence among Japanese in Java – as well
as the continuing fixation on resolving
Japan’s ‘China problem’ which prefig-
ured the Japanese experience in Indone-
sia and elsewhere. Where Chinese
resistance had previously left Japan’s
imperial spokesmen ‘wordless’, the
warm Southeast Asian reception now
seemed to provide Japan with a long-
sought ‘reply.’
There is a story of the China Pacification
Unit (Shina senbuhan). 
They argued that Japan and China have
the same script and are of the same race
(dôbun dôshu), they are brothers, and
they should proceed with hands joined. 
Someone in the audience replied - Alright,
but China is the older brother. 
It is said the members of the pacification
unit had no words to answer this for some
time.
How wonderful if they had been able to
reply immediately.
It is a problem of history – when you are
properly aware of Japan’s history, the
answer is extremely simple.
Japan has always been leader of the Asia-
Pacific sphere from ancient times – if you
know this history, that is enough.
Japan has always been constructing
China - if you know this history, that is
enough.
We are now seeing this truth with our
own eyes in the Greater East Asia War.
We must be aware that this truth before
our eyes has been continuously repeated
in China since ancient times.
What is true in China is, again, true in
the southern regions. Japanese people,
take great pride!
It is an irony of history that Shimizu’s
closing assertions were eventually to
prove correct, albeit hardly in the way that
Shimizu, and the many Japanese whose
views he represented, might have hoped.
As Indonesians who lived through
Japan’s increasingly exploitative and bru-
tal three and a half-year occupation will
attest - and despite Japanese claims and
Indonesian hopes to the contrary - it was
inevitable that the imperial chickens
Japan had raised in China would even-
tually come home to roost in Southeast
Asia. For all its idealism, the promise of
‘Greater Asia’ was no match for the inex-
orably imperial political, economic, and
cultural logic of Japan’s wartime regime.
But more than this: in its very contradic-
tions, ‘Greater Asia’ was not only a vivid
sign of its late-imperial times - it was also,
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How were the Sino-Japanese and Asia-Pacific Wars related to one another? In terms of military strategy, competition for raw
materials, diplomacy and the like, historians have long acknowledged connections between the conflicts, and how one prefigured
the other. Yet, beyond the obvious military-strategic links, other kinds of inter-relationships between developments in the China
theater and in other parts of Asia subsequently occupied by Japan have received much less attention, particularly in terms of
transnational cultural history. 
Connecting the experiences of 
the Sino-Japanese and Asia-Pacific Wars
the message of ‘Greater Asia’ was originally meant for
Northeast Asian consumption. Wittingly or not,
Chinese resistance played a critical role in its making,
elaboration, and radicalization
Mirror image? Cartoonist Ono Saseo’s 1942 depiction of Japanese-Indonesian cultural resemblances
also seems to suggest a more ‘civilized’ Japan.
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